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ABSTRACT
To combat against adversarial attacks, autoencoder structure
is widely used to perform denoising which is regarded as gra-
dient masking. In this paper, we revisit the role of autoen-
coders in adversarial settings. Through the comprehensive
experimental results and analysis, this paper presents the in-
herent property of adversarial robustness in the autoencoders.
We also found that autoencoders may use robust features that
cause inherent adversarial robustness. We believe that our
discovery of the adversarial robustness of the autoencoders
can provide clues to the future research and applications for
adversarial defense.
Index Terms— Deep learning, adversarial robustness,
adversarial example
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown
remarkable performance improvement in image classification
tasks. Despite their astonishing performance, the DNNs are
vulnerable to images with imperceptible perturbations [1, 2].
Such perturbed images are called adversarial examples. This
adversarial vulnerability can raise severe issues directly re-
lated to safety in many applications such as autonomous driv-
ing and malware detection. For that reason, the researches
related to adversarial robustness are essential to maintain clas-
sification performance against these malicious attacks.
To alleviate this adversarial vulnerability, additional mod-
ules are actively utilized to complement DNNs vulnerabil-
ity. Among these methods, autoencoder structures are widely
used as additional modules, and they are generally adopted to
add denoising functions [3, 4, 5, 6]. However, denoising func-
tions depend on gradient masking which makes DNNs gradi-
ents contain less information in generating adversarial exam-
ples. In recent years, many researches have been successful
in attacking gradient masking-based defenses [7, 8, 9]. As a
result, for precise evaluation, the additional modules should
not have gradient masking effect. However, research on au-
toencoders that do not lead to gradient masking is insufficient
inspite of wide usage of autoencoders for adversarial defense.
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Therefore, in this paper, we examine the autoencoder in
the adversarial robustness point of view. To analyze the ro-
bustness of the autoencoder structure in adversarial settings,
we perform extensive experiments based on the autoencoder
to be directly utilized as additional modules. We find that
autoencoders have inherent adversarial robustness in various
environments. In detail, using a simple autoencoder, classifi-
cation performance is improved in both white and black-box
environments. Besides, comparing with other gradient mask-
ing defense methods, we show that the performance is not
based on the gradient masking effect. Moreover, we show
that the features used in autoencoders are themselves robust
to adversarial attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work to analyze the adversarial robustness nature of
the autoencoder in adversarial settings from various angles.
Our analysis can be hints for the cause of existing adversarial
defense methods using autoencoders.
The main contributions of our research can be summa-
rized as follows:
• We verify that autoencoders are adversarially robust,
not depending on gradient masking effects through
massive experimental results.
• We analyze that the cause of the adversarial robust-
ness of autoencoders may derive from robust features.
Moreover, our experimental results show that the robust
features can be the same cause of the robustness of ad-
versarial training. Understanding the features used in
autoencoders can present the researchers to get an in-
sight into adversarial robustness.
2. AUTOENCODER-CLASSIFIER STRUCTURE TO
BE ANALYZED AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To investigate the adversarial robustness of the autoencoder,
we attached an autoencoder in front of the classifier. With
this widely used structure in the previous methods [3, 4, 5, 6],
we tried to look into the adversarial robustness in various
angles. We used pretrained autoencoders using the L2 loss
as the objective function. The whole network, namely the
whole classifier, AE-C, is shown in Fig. 1. In detail, the
encoder and decoder consist of 3 convolution layers with 2
pooling layers and 3 convolution layers with 2 transposed
layers, respectively. For a fair comparison, all the backprop-
agations needed to generate adversarial examples are com-
puted through the whole classifier as represented by the dot-
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Fig. 1: Framework of Whole Classifier (AE-C). Dotted arrow
indicates gradient flow of gradient-based attack.
Table 1: Accuracy (%) on adversarial attacks with different
perturbations ε. C indicates classifier alone. ε is the value
of when the image is normalized from 0 to 255. We set the
confidence c=0 for CW attack.
MNIST CIFAR10
Attack ε C AE-C ε C AE-C
× 0 98.23 98.33 0 89.67 88.32
FGSM 20 69.94 88.98 5 24.51 30.4780 2.16 50.24 10 15.24 21.02
PGD 20 30.63 71.24 5 2.58 5.1480 0.00 2.45 10 0.19 0.55
CW c=0 8.50 9.40 c=0 9.70 10.80
DF - 0.88 37.67 - 8.20 9.40
ted arrows in Fig. 1. We use two widely studied datasets
MNIST [10] and CIFAR10 [11] with two publicly available
networks LeNet5 [10] and VGG16 [12] as vanilla classifiers.
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
3.1. Adversarial Robustness of AE-C
3.1.1. Adversarial accuracy against white-box attacks
We investigated the adversarial robustness of the framework
of Fig. 1 (i .e. AE-C) in the white-box environment. We
applied four adversarial attack methods (FGSM [2], PGD
[13], Carlini & Wagner (CW) [14], and DeepFool (DF) [15]).
FGSM updates images only once to maximize loss function
using gradients and PGD iteratively conducts FGSM. CW
optimizes objective function to change predictions with small
perturbations. DF iteratively updates inputs with linear ap-
proximation. The experimental results are shown in Table 1.
Following the Table 1, adversarial accuracy was increased
against various attacks with different size of perturbations.
More specifically, in the MNIST experiments, classification
accuracy drastically reduces with increasing size of perturba-
tions without an autoencoder. On the other hand, the AE-C
maintains the classification accuracy, relatively well. Similar
tendencies were shown in stronger attacks such as DF and
CW.
However, improved accuracy against white-box attacks
does not mean adversarial robustness. Masking the input gra-
dients to impede creating adversarial examples can also im-
Table 2: Accuracy (%) on black-box adversarial attacks with
different perturbations ε. C indicates classifier alone. ε is the
value of when the image is normalized from 0 to 255. (a)
Totally new classifiers were used as substitute models. (b)
Same structured classifiers were used as substitute models.
MNIST CIFAR10
Attack ε C AE-C ε C AE-C
FGSM 20 96.53 97.07 5 62.07 69.4980 69.96 72.95 10 47.47 57.03
PGD 20 96.52 97.19 5 62.07 69.4980 65.64 81.39 10 28.56 49.45
(a)
MNIST CIFAR10
Attack ε C AE-C ε C AE-C
FGSM 20 92.46 96.24 5 49.62 61.6380 32.03 73.94 10 28.34 44.36
PGD 20 88.20 95.60 5 42.80 66.3380 1.11 71.90 10 18.28 44.91
(b)
prove white-box adversarial accuracy. Defenses using gradi-
ent masking is not desired because those defenses are known
to be easily destroyed [7, 8, 9]. Verification that adversarial
accuracy improvement of the AE-C is not caused by the gra-
dient masking effect is conducted in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.2. Is this caused by gradient masking effects?
To verify that the achieved adversarial accuracy using the au-
toencoder does not rely on the gradient masking effect, we
examined in various ways. Firstly, adversarial defenses using
gradient masking effects are often more vulnerable to black-
box attacks [8]. Thus, we conducted black-box attacks against
the vanilla classifier and the AE-C using FGSM and PGD. We
generated adversarial examples using two types of substitute
classifiers [16] for a fair comparison. First, we adopt different
classifier network than the vanilla network to generate adver-
sarial examples. The autoencoder used the same structure as
the vanilla network. Specifically, we used LeNet-like model
for MNIST and Resnet-110 [17] for CIFAR10 as substitute
classifiers. Also, since the autoencoder is trained to be un-
able to reconstruct perfectly using dimensionality reduction
[18], concerns about the diminishing effect of the adversarial
perturbations may be raised. Therefore, we also considered
the second type. For the second type, we adopt the same
structured network with the vanilla classifiers and AE-C as
substitute classifiers. Table 2 (a) and (b) indicate the above-
mentioned first and second cases, respectively. Table 2 shows
that the autoencoder is also robust in the black-box environ-
ment.
Secondly, we examined the effect of the autoencoder on
other defense methods. We adopt two gradient masking based
approaches; using temperature T of 2.5 and Guided Comple-
ment Entropy (GCE) [19]. GCE aims to flatten the output
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Fig. 2: Comparison of using an autoencoder with other defense methods on CIFAR10 dataset. Experiments in first row and
second row are done in white and black-box environments, respectively. C+T and (AE-C)+T denote the vanilla classifier and
AE-C trained with temperature T of 2.5, respectively. C+GCE and (AE-C)+GCE denote the vanilla classfier and AE-C where
trained with GCE objective, respectively. Note that FGSM attacks were conducted in (a), (c), (e) and (g), and PGD attacks were
conducted in (b), (d), (f) and (h).
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Fig. 3: Experiment to see the effect of autoencoder on the
features used by the classifier.
weights of false classes. Because GCE uses a kind of regular-
ization, and we observe black-box attacks successfully defeat
this method, we categorized this method to one of the gradient
masking based methods.
Following the first row of Fig. 2, in the white-box envi-
ronment, the experiment shows that the adversarial accuracy
of the AE-C with the gradient masking is higher than that of
using the gradient masking alone. We also tested in the black-
box environment as shown in the second row of Fig. 2. Using
temperature or the GCE alone was not robust against black-
box attacks at all, as expected. On the other hand, adversarial
accuracy increased when used with an autoencoder. These
results also show that the autoencoder has a different effect
from the gradient masking effect.
3.2. Robust Features of Autoencoder
Recently, some studies [20, 21] argue that to obtain adver-
sarial robustness, DNNs should learn robust features which
are robust to adversarial perturbations. They pointed out that
the adversarial vulnerability may stem from non-robust fea-
tures that DNNs learn to maximize classification accuracies.
We hypothesized that the autoencoder uses robust features
for reconstruction so that the autoencoder is somewhat ro-
bust against adversarial attacks. To verify this hypothesis, we
conducted an experiment by constructing a network as shown
in Fig. 3. Classification is performed on latent features that
have passed through the encoder. The encoder composed of
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) roles a feature ex-
tractor and the classification layer classifies the encoded fea-
tures. The network was jointly trained to minimize L2 recon-
struction loss of the autoencoder and cross-entropy loss of the
classifier. By training the two losses together, we expected
the features used by the classifier to be affected by the au-
toencoder. We conducted the experiments on MNIST dataset
to control the optimization accurately. We planned two dif-
ferent training tasks to control the effect of the autoencoder.
Firstly, given the cross-entropy loss Lce and the L2 recon-
struction loss Lrec, we regulated the effect of the autoencoder
by a parameter λ. Total loss L becomes as follows:
L = Lce + λLrec. (1)
We optimized our network to minimize the total loss L. We
will call this method as a regularization method.
Secondly, in every training step, we minimized Lce in ad-
vance of Lrec. After that, the network was optimized to mini-
mize Lrec for γ times. By choosing a parameter γ, similar to
λ, we tried to control the degree of effects of the autoencoder.
We will call this as an alternative method.
As shown in Table 3, it seems that the increased influence
of the autoencoder in the feature learning process made the
classification more robust to adversarial examples. However,
following our observations, λ larger than 4 and γ larger than 2
rather made overall adversarial accuracy decrease. We think
this is because the priority of the classification, the primary
Table 3: Effect of an autoencoder with respect to λ and γ.
The values of ε are the values when the image is normalized
from 0 to 255. (a) Regularization method. (b) Alternative
method.
ε λ=0 λ=1 λ=4
FGSM 20 63.73 69.07 72.4850 9.3 11.96 13.52
PGD 20 28.78 36.53 39.8650 0.02 0.20 0.51
(a)
ε γ=0 γ=1 γ=2
FGSM 20 63.73 69.02 70.2650 9.3 13.60 14.67
PGD 20 28.78 40.40 49.5150 0.02 0.37 4.89
(b)
objective of our process, became too lower than the recon-
struction.
Why are the features used by autoencoders robust? We
assume that the adversarial examples are generated using
class-related information, and autoencoder learns features
without any class-related information. Thus, the features
used by autoencoders can become less sensitive to adver-
sarial attacks. Making the features less discriminative (i.e.
less class-related) accords well with the well-known trade-off
between robustness and accuracy [13, 20]. There are many
observations that the accuracy on clean data decreases when
the classifier is adversarially trained [13, 22].
Therefore, we also combined adversarial training with the
autoencoder. If the adversarial robustness of the autoencoder
and the adversarial training stem from the same cause, the
performance of combining the autoencoder and the adversar-
ial training will not be much enhanced than the adversarial
training alone. We adopted PGD training [13]. The results are
shown in Fig. 4. Comparing Fig. 4 (a) and (b), the accuracy
gap became smaller when the adversarially trained classifier
was used in the case of MNIST. Nevertheless, adversarial ac-
curacy increased significantly. In the case of CIFAR10, when
the autoencoder was attached to the adversarially trained clas-
sifier, the adversarial accuracy rather reduced.
To examine the cause of the differences between the two
datasets, we compared the amplitudes of the gradients. Re-
ducing gradients is one of the gradient masking approaches
which makes it hard to create adversarial examples. We mea-
sured the gradients after the softmax layer with respect to the
input layer as follows:
N∑
i=1
|∇f(xi)|1 /N, (2)
where xi is i-th input, f is the whole classifier including soft-
max layer, and N is total number of test set.
As shown in Table 4, the gradients became higher for CI-
FAR10 and lower for MNIST when using the autoencoders.
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Fig. 4: Combining autoencoder with PGD training. (a) and
(b) are conducted on MNIST, and (c) and (d) are conducted
on CIFAR10. PGD trained classifiers are denoted as advC.
Table 4: Mean of gradient amplitude (G)
Dataset CIFAR10 (VGG) MNIST (LeNet)
Model C AE-C C AE-C
G 5.9× 10−3 6.9× 10−3 8.9× 10−4 4.3× 10−3
For MNIST, the effect of the reduced gradients may also have
contributed to the adversarial accuracy in the white-box envi-
ronments. Thus, the effect can be illustrated by the fact that
the accuracy gap in the black-box is smaller than in the white-
box as shown in Table 1 and 2. Specifically, when the vanilla
classifer achieved about 70% accuracy, AE-C achieved about
89% adversarial accuracy in the white-box environment while
it achieved only about 73% in the black-box environment.
Differences between the two datasets in Fig. 4 can also be
caused by increased and decreased gradients.
Following the experimental results, we suggest that the
adversarial robustness of the autoencoders may stem from the
features used in the autoencoders. There seems to be adver-
sarial robustness more than the effect of reduced gradients.
This adversarial robustness may be the same as the robust-
ness gained through the adversarial training.
4. CONCLUSION
For the safe use of the DNNs, the adversarial robustness must
be addressed. In this paper, we revisited the role of the autoen-
coder in adversarial settings. Improved adversarial accuracy
was observed in both white and black-box environments. Ex-
perimental results showed that the improved adversarial ac-
curacy differs from gradient masking effect. The adversarial
robustness may stem from the features that the autoencoder
learns. Moreover, the robust features can be the same as the
cause of adversarial robustness of adversarial training. The
adversarial robustness of the autoencoder could be hints to
the unresolved question: Where comes the adversarial vul-
nerability?
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